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I am honored to have been asked to give this year’s James
Madison Lecture. I hesitate to single out any of my extraordinary
predecessors at this podium—there are too many great judges to list,
and too much risk of slighting any. So I will note only that the list
includes both judges for whom I clerked more than forty years ago,
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., and Chief Judge Wilfred Feinberg, of
the court on which I now serve. That long-ago law clerk could not
have dreamed of being someday in a position once occupied by those
two giants of my current profession: the art and craft of judging.
That profession, that art, is under considerable pressure today. In
the legal academy, there has long been a body of thought that sees the
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work of judges as a mere mask for the exercise of raw power. Increasingly, our political leaders act as if to reinforce the message of critical
theorists, and their actions may help to turn that message from a
theory to a reality. The press cannot seem to report the decision of a
federal court on a matter of political significance without identifying
the judges who made it by the political party of the President who
appointed them. The general public, which has tended to rate the judiciary highest among the three branches of our government, seems
increasingly skeptical. And indeed, whenever I speak to nonlawyers
about what judges do, their questions often seem to assume that when
confronted with questions that touch on controversial issues of public
policy, the role of the judge is simply to decide what is the best rule—
by which of course the questioner means “to reach the outcome that
[the questioner thinks] is [ideologically or politically] correct.”
If politicians, editorialists, and law students seem to expect judges
to decide cases based on their political preferences, judges speaking
out in defense of judicial independence often take an opposite, but
equally simplistic, tack: resorting to metaphors that seem to strip
judges of judgment, as if judges could be replaced by something like
the “K-zone” computer that television baseball commentators use to
critique the performance of umpires. Other judges retreat to a set of
formalistic rules that (an informed but cynical citizen might observe)
produce, with suspicious regularity, results that correspond to the
policy preferences of one political party. It is not a good time for
nuance and complexity, but nuance and complexity is what, for good
or ill, I have to offer this evening.
I want to speak about a jurisprudential question that was a hot
academic topic when I was a young lawyer: whether there are correct
answers to difficult questions of law. I caution that I am not a professional philosopher of law, and so I approach this topic not from deep
theoretical premises but from the experience of many years of trying
to make sense of concrete legal problems, as a practicing lawyer and
judge, as well as a legal academic. The answers I will propose, I am
afraid, are somewhat personal, and are rooted not in jurisprudential
first principles, but in what it feels like, at least for me, to act as a
judge.
The debate over right answers was often formulated, in the era of
my youth, as one aspect of a debate between two formidable legal
philosophers, the then-established eminence H.L.A. Hart and the
then-upstart Ronald Dworkin, later to grace the faculty of this law
school. Hart had contended that the system of rules created by legislation and precedent left a considerable number of questions open to
judicial lawmaking, where the judge must exercise judgment and dis-
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I
RIGHT ANSWERS

1
2

H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 135 (3d ed. 2012).
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81 (1977).

06/05/2020 12:42:34

To start with, I suppose I need to define my terms. What do we
even mean by a right answer? That is a fair question, though it is not
one that unduly vexes the counselor at law in her office facing a question from a client. My working, purely functional, definition of a right
answer is by and large the one that a lawyer answering a client’s question has implicitly in mind. What I mean is simply that the answer to a
legal question is right when a lawyer asking the question can answer it

42254-nyu_95-3 Sheet No. 5 Side A

cretion. As he put it, “at the margin of rules and in the fields left open
by the theory of precedents, the courts perform a rule-producing function . . . very like the exercise of delegated rule-making powers by an
administrative body.”1 In contrast, Dworkin argued that this theory
was inadequate, and proposed what he contended was a “better
theory”: “that even when no settled rule disposes of the case, one
party may nevertheless have a right to win.”2 That disagreement was
part of a much broader jurisprudential debate, which long pre-dates
Hart and Dworkin, and has continued in the decades since I encountered it in Dworkin’s book, concerning the relationship between law
and morality. As I’ve noted, I am not qualified to enter that broader
debate. I want to address only the humbler question of how a working
judge struggles with the many questions that confront him or her in
deciding actual cases.
In doing so, I want to suggest three propositions: First, that while
most legal disputes can be resolved by identifying answers that are
clearly correct under ordinary rules of legal reasoning, Hart is right
that a significant number of important cases, including many that are
politically salient, do not have answers that can be classified as “right”
simply by applying those rules. Second, that one important reason for
this conclusion is that the principles of reasoning that are sufficient to
resolve most legal questions have exceptions and qualifications that
frequently require the exercise of judicial judgment. And third, that
the recognition that judgment is required in such cases is important to
validating the principle of judicial restraint, a critical value that can
only have real bite in a world in which judges are acknowledged to be
exercising judgment in selecting an answer from among several more
or less equally viable lines of reasoning, while the effort to resolve
cases by more mechanical rules can point to unrestrained judicial
interventions in the political process.
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with a solid conviction that a substantial majority of competent lawyers and judges would give the same answer and would find that
answer essentially uncontroversial. Such an answer is the one the
lawyer would regard as right.
It can be objected that this definition prejudices Dworkin in the
philosophical debate or begs the question he wants to answer. While
he contends that the judge’s duty is to decide “what the rights of the
parties are, not to invent new rights retrospectively,” he quickly qualifies that by adding that it is “no part of [his] theory that any mechanical procedure exists for demonstrating what the rights of parties are
in hard cases,” and that “reasonable lawyers and judges will often disagree about legal rights.”3 I don’t purport to argue that my definition
answers some ontological question about what law is or what answers
are right in some absolute or abstract sense. My definition, however, is
the one I expect most lawyers would give, because it is born of the
work of explaining law to actual clients and arguing points of law to
judges, both from the advocate’s podium as a lawyer and in conference rooms as a judge.
In those very practical contexts, it seems to me that if I do not
have an argument—not necessarily a purely “mechanical” one, but
one solidly rooted in traditional lawyerly methodology—that will persuade a substantial majority of judges, regardless of their political persuasion, their jurisprudential assumptions, or the political party
responsible for their election or appointment, then I do not have a
legal answer that is clearly right. It doesn’t matter to my client, who
wants to know whether she can deduct the expense from gross income
or whether he will incur liability if he takes a certain action, what a
legal philosopher would conclude is ontologically the “correct” legal
answer, or even whether the philosopher believes there is such a thing.
If I cannot answer the client’s question with some degree of certainty,
there is, in the only sense that matters to the client, no right answer;
there is at best an answer that comes with some degree of risk of
turning out to be wrong.
The same is true when I confront a question posed in appellate
briefs by capable and conscientious lawyers. As I assess the case, if the
lawyers are indeed competent, there will often be at least some more
or less plausible arguments made by each side. As I try to work my
way to an answer, I am often thinking about whether the answer that
seems most persuasive to me will likely be persuasive to the other
judges assigned to the panel that will decide the case, judges who may
have different political values and jurisprudential approaches than I
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4 That doesn’t mean the lawyer on the losing side of the argument was not competent.
That lawyer may have honestly advised her client that their legal argument was precarious,
and indeed that the judges almost certainly wouldn’t buy it, but that there was at least a
colorable argument that, in light of the stakes of the case, was worth the perhaps modest
additional cost of an appeal.

42254-nyu_95-3 Sheet No. 6 Side A

do. In a great many cases, the answer is clearly yes—that my interpretation of the governing statutory or contractual language, or my conclusion as to whether a cited precedent is controlling or
distinguishable, is sufficiently solid that it will likely appeal to the
others, regardless of whether they are “Obama judges” or “Trump
judges,” “Clinton judges” or “Bush judges.” The answer is comfortably, if not unequivocally, right. I am not always correct in my prediction; sometimes one of us may just have overlooked some argument
that renders the case more problematic, and sometimes one of us may
be blinded by an unrecognized ideological presupposition that makes
something seem very clear to the person holding that belief, but that
someone with a different set of political or jurisprudential principles
may see quite differently. But when I am confident of what the views
of the panel will likely be, I am usually correct, and the result winds
up being unanimous regardless of the composition of the panel.4
But there are other cases where the legal materials seem, to me,
open to divergent views. The lawyers on both sides present persuasive
arguments, and even if I have a fairly strong view that one side has the
better argument, I expect that the case may produce different answers
from different judges, sometimes for reasons that the general public or
the editorial page of the New York Times would classify in political
terms, but sometimes just because the materials simply point in divergent directions, and I cannot be sure that they will be assembled in the
same way even by a colleague with whom I generally share political or
jurisprudential values.
From my vantage as a judge sitting on a court that operates collegially, it doesn’t matter very much, any more than it matters to the
lawyer counseling a client, whether I decide, with Dworkin, that my
answer is “right” in some larger moral, political, or jurisprudential
sense, or consider that the question is one on which the court has “discretion” to act, to which a colleague’s projected answer is more or less
equally valid to mine. Each of us on the panel has to decide for himself or herself which set of arguments is more persuasive, and if we
aren’t unanimous about that, whichever side gets two votes wins.
Moreover, in a system of precedent, that result becomes, in my
functional sense, the law (at least, the law in our circuit, at least until
and unless the Supreme Court or our court sitting en banc overrules
the decision). Once the case has been decided, a lawyer advising her
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client in a closely similar situation can now give a definitive “right”
answer to the legal question. That is what we mean when we say that
the court has adopted a rule or decided that a given legal proposition
is correct. If my panel is struggling with a difficult legal question and
we know that the same question is pending in a case that was argued
before the Supreme Court earlier in the Term, we are likely to hold
the case pending the Supreme Court’s decision because it is very likely
that, once that decision is released, our question will become an easy
one. I may shake my head and say that the Court got the answer
“wrong”—meaning that I would have balanced differently the divergent factors and arguments that made the case difficult—but there is
no longer a doubt about the correct legal answer.
Perhaps my description will seem simplistic to the philosophically
sophisticated. But that is the way law works, and all practicing lawyers
and judges know it.
II
EASY CASES

42254-nyu_95-3 Sheet No. 6 Side B
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In terms of my definition, as the above discussion illustrates, it
follows that there are indeed right answers to most legal questions.
That proposition too will surprise no practicing lawyer, though it may
surprise some first-year law students. Their surprise may stem partly
from a theoretical commitment to some version of legal realism or
critical legal theory, but it probably stems more from the quite reasonable preoccupation of legal education, particularly at the most highly
regarded schools, with teaching students how to argue difficult legal
issues. No one is going to pay lawyers top dollar to answer questions
that any reasonably literate person can answer simply by reading the
words of a statute or rule. It is better for our students to develop a
facility for understanding how to decipher more problematic rules or
cases and how to argue for the client’s preferred result in a case that is
subject to considerable doubt. But that focus tends to give students
the impression that virtually any legal proposition can be argued for
or against with equal plausibility.
The vast majority of legal questions that arise in most people’s
day-to-day lives, however, are easy ones. And that is a good and
indeed necessary thing. People should be, for the most part, free to go
about their business with some confidence that their common-sense,
socially mediated judgments of how a person should act will accord
with the society’s laws. We don’t want people to need an expensive
consultation with counsel before acting in ways most people would
find unproblematic. And even when questions require a legal consul-
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tation, because they depend on rules that are more specialized or
technical and are not simply reflections of common moral judgments,
the answers will often be readily accessible to a trained professional.
Most legal questions are, in practice, answered not by the Supreme
Court, or by any other court, but by lawyers sitting in their offices.
“What do I have to do to make an enforceable will?” “If I get a
divorce, how will my and my spouse’s property be divided?” “Am I
likely to be civilly liable to someone if I do this?” Our society would
be in terrible shape if such questions could not, most often, be
answered with some certainty, or if a lawyer could say only that it
depends on whether you get an “Obama judge” or a “Trump judge.”
Whatever shape you think the country is in, its problems do not
include that one. Lawyers are typically able to answer the questions
their clients put to them with a fair measure of certainty, perhaps not
off the top of their heads but after carefully debriefing the client about
all the facts and circumstances of the client’s particular situation and
doing research into statutes, regulations, and precedents. Even when
no definitive answer is possible, the lawyer can usually give a sufficiently definite answer to solve the client’s problem: “If you do it that
way, there’s a pretty good chance you can get this tax benefit, but if
you structure the transaction in this alternative way, you will definitely
get the benefit at only a modest additional cost, so it’s worth the
trouble and expense to do it that way instead.” Or: “There is a sufficiently high risk that what you proposed will be construed as fraud
that you simply don’t want to take the risk.”
That is hardly an original or controversial point, but it’s worth
making because an overbroad cynicism about law is sometimes
expressed by members of the public or even sophisticated legal commentators. Language is imperfect at conveying meaning, but it is not
infinitely open-ended. Legal materials may be open to interpretation,
but they are not infinitely malleable.
But of course, even the cynics don’t really mean that all law is
open to political manipulation; they mean only a certain category of
legal decisions, usually by the Supreme Court, usually in constitutional
matters. That is, what the cynics really mean is that the subset of constitutional cases that reach the Supreme Court and that involve questions that are of great political interest and on which society is deeply
divided, are not easily decided by reference to conventional legal
materials. So it is of some importance to realize that the basic bedrock
of the law is not a matter of politics but of reasonably clear rules that
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are capable of neutral application and are routinely so applied.5 The
questions that can be answered in this way are many in number, and
they are hardly trivial, especially considered in the aggregate. The
skeptical attitude of the press, the public, and our students tends to
overlook this body of real, everyday law, as it operates in law offices
and in most of our courts most of the time, to focus intense attention
on a relatively small number of cases that are most likely to present
difficult questions to which the answers are inherently controversial.
It’s also worth considering what a lawyer does to answer these
easy questions. For the most part, the answer is indeed to follow certain formal—one could almost say mechanistic—rules. Close reading
of texts, the use of internal and extrinsic evidence to understand what
their authors most likely intended to accomplish, and adherence to
precedent using the common-law tools of stare decisis and the careful
distinction of cases based on their distinct facts, will produce reliable
answers to most matters that come to the attention of lawyers and will
lead to reliable predictions of how a court is likely to decide even most
questions that somebody thought were worth litigating.
III
HARDER CASES
That said, many cases that find themselves before courts—particularly appellate courts and especially the Supreme Court—are harder.
But even there, it is many, not most. There are economic and structural reasons why many cases even in the federal courts of appeals are
one-sided.6 But for the most part lawsuits are filed, and appeals pur42254-nyu_95-3 Sheet No. 7 Side B
06/05/2020 12:42:34

5 I don’t mean to question the insight that legal rules generally reflect the interests and
viewpoints of the dominant forces or classes in society. What would it even mean to
characterize a group as dominant if it did not control the content of legal rules? Whether
that dominant force is taken to be “a democratic majority” or “the aristocracy” or “the
bourgeoisie” or “bicoastal elites,” the test of its dominance is its ability to have its
preferences adopted as law. Presumably, the law against theft represents the interests of
owners of property (and perhaps of all those who aspire one day to be in that category). I
am not attempting to assess whether our legal rules are just or our institutions democratic,
but rather to answer the more banal questions of whether there is a law against theft and
what it covers. There is, and a lawyer can pretty readily tell you how it can be expected to
be applied in the vast majority of situations.
6 For example, the stakes in criminal cases are high enough for defendants that if a
client has means, even a small chance of success may be worth pursuing, and defendants
without means are provided with free appellate counsel, who are ethically required to
pursue any appeal that is not entirely frivolous. A strikingly high percentage of civil
appeals are brought by pro se litigants, and while some of these raise serious questions,
most are brought by people who, understandably, have limited understanding of the legal
system, and so make arguments that are easily resolved by reference to “clearly established
law.” From a different corner of the legal universe, cases where hundreds of millions of
dollars are at stake will sometimes make it worth a client’s while to pursue an appeal that
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may cost a few hundred thousand dollars, even if the chances of winning are quite low.
And of course, some litigants pursue matters regardless of the chances of winning, out of
grudge or principle.
7 Those questions may not involve the ultimate merits of grand competing claims
about politically salient issues of law. By the time an appeal is taken, the losing side may
well be pursuing a procedural or evidentiary point that can produce a do-over that will give
the formerly losing side a chance to fight again, or at a minimum raises the costs and risks
for the other side sufficiently to create a settlement more favorable than the result in the
trial court. Thus, even if the appellant’s case is ultimately weak, the issue actually being
contested on appeal may be an arcane one that is far more complicated or disputable.
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sued, for economically rational reasons. Cases fail to settle, and are
pursued to higher levels, when each party perceives a reasonable
chance of winning. Sometimes one side is wrong in its calculations.
But a great many questions that come before the courts are there
because there are reasonable arguments on both sides.7
How does a judge approach these cases? I would say, very much
the way the lawyer in her office would if a client asked her to answer
the same question. We do indeed first look for a simple, mechanical
answer. Read the governing rule or statute. Consult the relevant
precedents. Hope—sometimes against hope—that a clear answer will
emerge. I must tell you that most judges, and certainly this one, are
very happy when it does. I don’t sit in my office waiting for a chance
to impose my policy views on the world. First of all, I don’t even have
policy views on most of the cases that come before me. Any judge has
to pass on huge numbers of cases in which she lacks specific legal, let
alone policy, expertise. On other issues, I may have policy views that
are good enough to serve me in the voting booth, where, like any citizen, I have to make decisions about which candidate will better serve
the country based on the best information available to me and the
best analysis I can manage in the time I can devote to understanding
salient public debates. But I know full well that such casually or even
strongly held views are not sufficiently certain to tempt me to impose
them when my job is to decide, as best I can, what the law provides.
And the volume of cases to be decided is such that judges will generally not have the time or energy to plumb potentially interesting questions to their depths; if the statutory language or a clear-cut precedent
leads to an easy answer, I am quite content to take it, whether or not I
think I would give the same answer if given absolute legislative power.
So I’m quite comfortable, as I am sure most judges I have worked
with are, with the fact that I have to apply the law even if, as a voter, I
would not have supported the adoption of that law. My main problem,
in getting through the cases that the luck of the wheel sends before
me, is just to figure out what the law is. In a great many cases, how-
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ever, that is a demanding task because neither statutes nor precedents
give consistently clear answers to the litigated questions before me.
What is so difficult about them? Why don’t statutes and case law
give clear answers?
IV
TEXTUALISM

06/05/2020 12:42:34

8 See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 630–31 (1984) (describing the set of rules directed
toward the general public as conduct rules and the set of rules directed at officials as
decision rules).
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Let’s begin with texts. Although we still train law students to
assess the weight of precedents in a common-law methodology, the
bulk of legal rules today are to be found in statutes. While American
lawyers might still research the questions their clients ask in some part
by doing case research, the ultimate source of authority for most legal
questions is going to be found in federal or state statutes. And for the
most part, the answer will be textual and based on something that a
lawyer would likely call “plain meaning.” Again, this isn’t or shouldn’t
be surprising. The law is made up of words; law can be described as an
effort to control people’s future behavior by means of words. Some
laws are addressed to the public, some to specialized segments
thereof, and some in effect only to judges and public officials.8 A lawgiver (in our society, usually a legislature or an executive agency exercising power delegated by the legislature) makes a rule to govern
some anticipated or recurrent situation—a rule that tells people what
to do the next time that situation arises. For the most part, the statute
is going to tell us what to do, hopefully rather clearly. The legislative
goal is usually (though not always) to state a rule clearly enough that a
lawyer (and indeed the general public) will understand that conduct
that was lawful yesterday is now prohibited, or vice versa, and that
goal is frequently accomplished tolerably well. The text of the
statute—or in some cases of another controlling document, such as a
contract—is always the first resort, and often the last.
But the text does not always offer a definitive answer. We all, I
think, owe a debt to the late Justice Scalia for recalling us to an insistence on the text as the first and most important source of statutory
meaning. Surely, the effort to control behavior by written laws is
hopeless if courts will ignore or resist what legislators have conscientiously tried to make clear. But the text is not always clear. Words can
be slippery, as we well know, and not every law is competently drafted
even to address its core concerns, let alone unanticipated variations.
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Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 18, 21–22 (2014) (describing the
impossibility of legislators reading every word contained in bills and the important role of
legislative history in facilitating the process of legislating).
11 Id. at 19–20.

06/05/2020 12:42:34
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Moreover, as any lawyer who has ever drafted a contract can attest,
no one has perfect foresight of all contingencies that can arise. A text
may be drafted effectively to give a clear answer to the question that
provoked its adoption, but the chosen language may turn out to be
quite ambiguous as to its effect on unanticipated situations.
Even when the law is not, strictly speaking, ambiguous, the text
may give an answer that a reader may have considerable doubt was
intended by the legislature. Sometimes the legislative history may give
us a pretty good indication of what was intended by the language that
was adopted. Again, we owe a debt to Justice Scalia for pointing out
that legislative history must be used with some care; sometimes statements are inserted into the congressional record that were never actually spoken on the floor of the House or Senate,9 and even if they
were spoken, there may have been no one present to hear and be
influenced by them, and the words may have been crafted strategically
by the member, her staff, or lobbyists for the precise purpose of influencing a future court to adopt a reading that could not have survived a
vote if language more clearly requiring that reading had been proposed as an amendment. All of that is true. But it is not the only, or
even the dominant, truth.
As Chief Judge Katzmann has reminded us in his powerful
insider’s account of how Congress actually works, the claim that the
words of a statute are sacred because those words are what the legislators actually voted on is an oversimplification.10 In many instances, to
the contrary, the legislators and even their staffs may have relied
heavily, in deciding how to vote, on committee reports describing the
content of bills, rather than on the dense and sometimes technical language of the bills themselves.11 Legislative history can thus be illuminating as to the intended meaning even of texts that may seem to
point fairly emphatically in only one direction.
Even in the absence of legislative history, moreover, even relatively clear texts sometimes seem to point to answers that are highly
questionable, both as a matter of policy, and as an understanding of
what the legislature was really trying to accomplish. And by that I do
not mean simply cases in which the result is, to use the favored formulation of plain meaning adherents, “absurd.” Whatever the rhetoric of
politicians, editorialists, and judges at confirmation hearings, courts
with some frequency confront texts that, taken literally, will lead to
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(1978) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–2253, 2423 (2012)).
14 X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. at 68 (emphasis added) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252(a)(1), (b) (1988)).
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results that seem unlikely to have been intended by a legislative
majority. And when you look at cases as they are actually decided,
rather than at political rhetoric, that truth is not really a matter that
divides “liberals” and “conservatives.”
Consider, for example, United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,12
which was decided by the Supreme Court in 1994. The case represents
a good example of something courts are often called upon to do: make
sense of a statute that probably did not anticipate all possible
applications.
The statute in question was the Protection of Children Against
Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977.13 As the name suggests, this is a
statute whose basic purpose enjoys universal support. But universal
acceptance of a policy goal may lead legislators to overlook certain
nuances of application. The specific issue in the case was whether the
provision of the statute prohibiting the distribution in interstate commerce of visual depictions of minors engaged in sexual conduct
required that the defendant knew that the films or photos he transported contained child pornography—that is, that they depicted actual
minors engaged in sexual activity.
The language of the statute, read in light of ordinary English
grammar, quite clearly does not require such knowledge. The word
“knowingly” does appear in the statute, but it appears in an entirely
separate clause from the one referring to the involvement of minors—
and indeed, the somewhat awkward structure of the provision appears
to avoid a more straightforward statement that would have made it
easy to read the knowledge requirement into the statute. The statute
might have said “whoever knowingly transports a visual depiction of a
minor engaged in sexually explicit behavior”—in which case it would
be a very natural, though not entirely grammatically conclusive,
reading to say that the word “knowingly” modified the entire predicate—not just the verb—such that to be guilty, one would need to
know (a) that one was transporting something in interstate commerce,
(b) that that something was a depiction of sexually explicit behavior,
and (c) that one of the persons engaged in that behavior was a minor.
But instead it punished any person who “knowingly transports . . . in
interstate . . . commerce . . . any visual depiction, if [the depiction is of
a minor engaged in sexual activity and] the producing of such . . .
depiction involves the use of a minor.”14 The location of the minor in
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the “if” clause isolates it from the verb “knowingly.” In ordinary
English writing, the word “knowingly” cannot apply to the presence of
the minor.
And that is exactly what Justice Scalia argued.15 But he lost, and
the loss was not close. The vote was 7-2, and the opinion was written
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, certainly not a “judicial activist” or “liberal.” Why? The core of the majority’s reasoning was that to read the
statute according to what the Chief Justice acknowledged was “[t]he
most natural grammatical reading” of the statute would require the
conclusion that Congress chose to punish criminally someone who
knowingly transported a particular package of film whose contents
were unknown to him, but which turned out to include images of child
pornography.16 The Chief Justice and six colleagues thought that was
a troubling result, noting that it would criminalize, among other essentially innocent people, “a retail druggist who returns an uninspected
roll of developed film to a customer . . . if it were later discovered that
the [film] contained images of children engaged in sexually explicit
conduct” because the druggist knew that he was transporting a “visual
depiction.”17
Now, I’m certainly not here to disagree with that result or to
argue that it lacked a firm basis in legal reasoning. Chief Justice
Rehnquist identified three principles of statutory interpretation that
enabled him to escape from a literal reading of the statute: the principle that statutes should not be read to require “absurd” results, the
presumption that criminal statutes contain mens rea or scienter
requirements—Latin phrases meaning, essentially, wrongful intent—
and the principle that statutes should be interpreted to avoid constitutional questions.18 That is all quite conventional legal reasoning.
But note that, as Justice Scalia’s refusal to join the opinion tells
you, they are not strictly “textualist” reasons, they are not independent of the majority’s policy preferences, and they do not involve a
simple matter of “calling balls and strikes.” As for avoiding absurd
results, absurdity is in the eye of the beholder, depending on a
wavering line between results that are merely odd or undesirable and
ones that are truly indefensible. Moreover, that line rests on judgments of policy or principle drawn from substantive values. The principle that criminal punishment ordinarily depends on a guilty mind is a
commonplace for criminal law scholars, and is second nature to lawyers, but legislators who have not been exposed to those principles
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may well prefer, where they believe it is important to achieve strong
deterrence of certain conduct, the idea of strict liability: If you are
going to transport pictures in interstate commerce, you are responsible for avoiding child pornography, at your peril. Such statutes have
been consciously created by legislators, and upheld, under various circumstances, by courts. To pin the label “absurd” on the consequences
of strict liability is mostly to say that the court thinks that the legislators in this instance should have (and perhaps would have if they had
thought more deeply about the matter) decided that the benefits of
imposing strict liability are not worth the costs.
The presumption against reading at least the more stringent types
of criminal statutes to impose strict liability is well established in our
law. But it is not ancient, and it is not a very good guide to deducing
what the legislators who voted for it actually meant. It was devised by
the great Justice Robert Jackson in Morissette v. United States in
1952,19 putting a brake on a run of cases in which the Court had read
various “modern” or “regulatory” criminal statutes as creating strict
liability. Justice Jackson, in one of the great feats of judicial sleight of
hand, read a statute punishing conversion of government property as
including the classic common-law mens rea of larceny—an intent to
deprive another permanently of his property—even though the statute
did not explicitly incorporate that mens rea, on the ground that
Congress had probably failed to include such an element only because
it was so familiar to lawyers that it went without saying.20
But if Jackson’s rule was a well-established precedent in 1994, he
pretty much made it up when he adopted it, for a unanimous court, in
1952. He certainly wasn’t calling balls and strikes or reading the
plain text of the controlling statute. And if we say that the Court in
X-Citement Video was relying on a precedent about how to read statutes, the very existence of precedent as a complicating factor tends to
undermine strict textualism. “Read it for the plain meaning” is, at
least in some cases, a rule that will produce a predictable “balls and
strikes” outcome, albeit one that in this case would have come out
badly for defendants. But “read it for plain meaning unless precedent
counsels otherwise” is much less predictable, given that precedents
are even slipperier than texts themselves.
Jackson’s case, in fact, did not require him to rule that all criminal
statutes necessarily should be read to include a mens rea element, and
he didn’t say that they should. He distinguished statutes that codified
long-standing common-law crimes, had severe penalties, and
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addressed conduct that was wrong in itself—for which mens rea would
be presumed to be required—from innovative statutes that had lowish penalties and prohibited conduct on the basis of regulatory policy
rather than basic morality.21 The child pornography statute had heavy
penalties and aimed to control conduct most people would consider
immoral. But it was not a traditional common-law crime, and a law
prohibiting the mere transportation of pornographic images might be
seen as a regulation of the mails and the internet rather than the
equivalent of traditional statutory rape laws that would penalize producing such images by coercing children into sex and filming the
result. Under these circumstances, is the presumption of mens rea
triggered? That is manifestly a judgment call.
As for the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, Justice Scalia
reminds us that this has been described by the Court as a way to interpret ambiguous statutes, not a way to avoid striking down clear but
unconstitutional ones.22 But the statute in question could not fairly be
called “ambiguous”—its literal meaning can only be read one way.
And the constitutional question avoided was perhaps not such a
demanding one; the Supreme Court has never actually written a mens
rea requirement into the Constitution, a step that would itself require
a bold interpretation of a document that has no explicit provision
incorporating traditional aspects of the substantive common law of
crimes.
At the heart of the X-Citement Video case is a violation by
Congress (and perhaps an inadvertent one) of what to judges is a
strong principle. Again, I have no quarrel with the principle or its
application to this case. I would have voted with the majority. I agree
with the principle, and I expect that most people, if they thought
about it, would agree both with the general presumption and with the
fact that the statute here should have complied with it. My point,
rather, is twofold: First, that this is a policy judgment, and one that—
quite as much as a belief that people should be allowed to marry
someone of the same sex if they choose—relies on a principle more
commonly understood and believed in by elite judges than by the lay
public; and second, that even “conservative” judges will commonly
exercise judgment based on such policy conclusions, even in the face
of apparently clear language.
If I had time, I could cite many similar cases. I’ll just briefly mention one: last Term’s United States v. Davis.23 The facts and legal ques-
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tion in that case, which concerned the meaning and constitutionality
of a federal statute defining “crimes of violence” for purposes of
enhancing the penalties applicable to such crimes when a defendant
carried a firearm during and in relation to that crime, are far too convoluted for me to address in detail. But the short of it is that the Court
needed to decide whether the definition of a violent crime was to be
applied “categorically,” meaning, in effect, either the crime is violent
in every instance that comes within the scope of its definition, or only
according to whether violence was used in the particular offense in
question.24 The majority went with the text, finding that the plain
24
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Davis involved a convoluted criminal law problem, specific to federal criminal law.
The relevant statute imposed severe mandatory sentences on persons who carried a gun
while committing a crime of violence. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012). The definition of crime of
violence encompasses two classes of crimes: (1) the so-called elements clause covers crimes
that have “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
the person or property of another,” and (2) the so-called residual or risk clause covers
offenses that “by [their] nature, involve[ ] a substantial risk that physical force against the
person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” Id.
§ 924(c)(3).
In prior cases involving similar sentence enhancements for defendants whose prior
record includes convictions for crimes of violence, the Court has insisted that a crime must
“categorically” satisfy the definition of a violent crime, meaning that a court does not apply
the penalty simply because the conduct that resulted in the conviction was violent. Rather,
the conviction must be for a crime that intrinsically satisfies the definition; unless the least
serious conduct that could produce a conviction under the statutory definition would
satisfy the definition of a violent crime, it isn’t one. In Davis, for example, the crime in
question was conspiracy to rob, and a conspiracy can be committed simply by two people
sitting at a dinner table who agree to commit a robbery; the actual use of force or violence
is not part of the elements of the crime. This is not the place to debate the reasons for or
the merits of this somewhat counterintuitive rule, which exempts from the intended
punishment criminals who have indisputably engaged in violent acts—or for that matter to
debate the reasonableness of the severe penalties involved. At any rate, that’s the rule.
The risk clause involves further problems. One might think that a conspiracy to
commit a violent crime inherently involves a risk of violence, and thus is “categorically” a
violent crime. But the Supreme Court has held that clause unconstitutionally vague, at
least as applied to recidivist sentences using the definition in § 16(b) because the Court
found it impossible to decide with any clarity when a crime by its nature, in the abstract,
poses a substantial risk that physical force will be used, and thus that the risk clause is too
vague to be constitutionally applied. See Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1215–16
(2018) (finding that the clause requires the sort of abstraction that leads to unpredictability
and arbitrariness, which is a violation of due process). Once again, that conclusion seems
counterintuitive; one might think that at least some crimes clearly enough involve such a
risk, and that it would be sufficient to hold that any crime that does not falls outside the
risk clause. But that’s not how the Supreme Court went.
That set the stage for Davis. The Supreme Court had acknowledged that many
criminal statutes are defined in terms of substantial risks but concluded that in those
instances, juries were tasked with assessing not whether a crime in the abstract posed a
risk, but whether the risk was occasioned by the defendant’s particular conduct. Johnson v.
United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2561 (2015) (distinguishing statutes that require risk
assessment in the context of a particular act from those statutes requiring risk assessment
in reference to an idealized act). Some courts of appeals, picking up on this distinction,
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noted that under § 924(c), the sentencing consequence for possession of a firearm was
attached not to a prior criminal record but to the commission of the particular offense
being tried by the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Barrett, 903 F.3d 166, 178 (2d Cir. 2018),
vacated, 139 S. Ct. 2774 (2019), abrogated by United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019).
Why wouldn’t it be possible to save the constitutionality of Congress’s definition by simply
not applying the categorical approach in these cases? The jury could be told to decide
whether there was a conspiracy in a particular case, in which the planning may have
culminated in conduct that came very close to the actual consummation of a violent crime.
The Supreme Court rejected that view by a 5-4 vote, with the majority finding that the
statute’s language clearly forbade such a case-by-case assessment. Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2330.
The “risk” clause was thus unconstitutional. Id. at 2336.
25 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B).
26 Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2334.
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meaning of the statute was clear: It applied when the offense posed a
risk of violence “by its nature.”25 Under existing Supreme Court precedent, that entailed a dramatic consequence: Such an interpretation
would render the statute unconstitutionally vague and would invalidate a severe mandatory sentence that had been routinely applied in a
wide variety of cases for decades.
Nevertheless, the “plain” textualist reading prevailed—but did so
by a bare 5-4 majority. The four justices in dissent were Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh, who wrote the
dissenting opinion. The dissenting justices would all, I am sure,
embrace in general terms some version of textualism and plain
meaning; it was Chief Justice Roberts for example, who famously
voiced the “balls and strikes” metaphor at his confirmation hearing,
and Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia’s rigidly textualist dissenting
opinion in X-Citement Video. Justice Gorsuch, writing for a majority
that included the Court’s four “liberal” members, derided the dissent,
in Scalian terms, for relying on “intuition” about how ordinary citizens
might read the statute to conclude that the majority’s reading was
“unnatural.”26 I don’t know that the majority’s reading of the statute
in Davis was quite as unambiguously correct on pure textualist
grounds as Justice Scalia’s in X-Citement Video, but I submit that you
will find that argument pretty decisively the better interpretation of
the letter of the law. But one might well question, as the dissenters do,
whether the Congress likely foresaw, intended, or would have
approved the majority’s reading of the statute—which in this case led,
by another complicated twist of legal reasoning, to finding the statute
unconstitutional.
My point is not to snipe at various justices for any perceived
inconsistencies of approach, though it may strike you as odd to see
“liberal” justices endorsing Scalian jurisprudence and “conservatives”
reaching for a sound policy outcome by rejecting the most natural
plain meaning of a statute. My point, rather, is that there is more to
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judging than a mechanical formula can capture. In both of these cases,
as in so many others, a substantial number of justices (a lopsided
majority in X-Citement Video and a near-majority in Davis)—in each
case including justices who have been touted, in some cases by themselves, as strict constructionists—rejected the most literal grammatical
meaning of a clear statutory text. In my view, the “intuition” that
Justice Gorsuch criticized is in fact the exercise of judgment. The cases
were genuinely close, notwithstanding the literal texts, because in each
case there were strong arguments that the consequences of following
the literal meaning gave significant pause about whether doing so
would be undesirable as a matter of policy—at least in the eyes of the
judges—and because there were legitimate, albeit not strictly textualist, arguments available in the legal tradition that give judges a role
in determining whether in some cases the legislature might not really
have intended those results. In each case, what was called for was a
weighing of those arguments and not simply a mechanical application
of a slogan.
It should not be surprising that deciding such a case can easily
divide nine reasonable people, committed to pursuing correct legal
outcomes, not strictly along “party” or even “ideological” lines, about
the best answer. At the same time, the exercise of judgment necessarily draws to some degree on a judge’s principles and life experience. I
don’t think it’s an accident that the textual argument in Davis—
strong, if not as strong as the textual argument in X-Citement Video—
prevailed with justices who are skeptical of incarceration (the four
supposedly more liberal justices and Justice Gorsuch, a supposed conservative who shows signs of a libertarian streak that is skeptical of
the expansive reach of federal law enforcement), or that adopting a
literal reading that would render unconstitutional a statute designed
to lock up violent criminals with guns would be unappealing to a
group including three former Justice Department lawyers, two of
them experienced prosecutors.
Professor Dworkin recognized that different judges with different
backgrounds and philosophies would reach different conclusions
about the right outcomes in legal cases, even if they all applied the
complex methodology that he proposed in place of any mechanical
approach. But with all due respect to him, I think it is a very special
gloss on the word “right” to contend that there is an answer that is
“right”—as a matter of law, and not just ideology or political value—
where the answer that individual judges decide is right is ultimately
dictated by their individual balancing of factors that include policy
judgments and that could not be predicted in advance based on the
application of purely methodological rules.
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In the limited time available to me for this Lecture, I can’t go on
to give similar detailed examples of why other vaunted techniques for
reaching right answers, which work well in many cases and form the
grist of ordinary legal analysis, will not always point to a clear answer.
But I can at least sketch some of the problems. Take, for example, the
principle of stare decisis—more Latin, this time meaning that a court’s
precedents must be followed by the same court or by those directly
inferior to it in the judicial hierarchy. As a result, we have “case law.”
Case law is trickier than statutory law because there is no canonical
text to be read; the judge must follow the same principles laid down in
prior cases not because the words of an earlier judge’s prior opinion
are authoritative, but simply in order to ensure that like cases are
decided alike. Attention will be paid to what the prior court said
about why it was deciding the case before it, but the words are less
important than the facts of the case, and later courts can reconcile a
decision that might depart from an earlier formulation of a legal rule
by distinguishing the next case, that is, by explaining why the decision
now being rendered is fully consistent with the actual resolution of the
prior case.
As I’ve already said, many legal rules are authoritatively “settled,” at least for the present, by the decision of an appellate court. It
is not unusual for the news media, or even more specialized legal publications, to tell us something along the lines of, “In a closely watched
case, the Supreme Court today settled a question that has divided
courts and patent lawyers . . . .” Before the Court decided the case, the
question was unsettled: By my definition, a lawyer could not have told
a client with any certainty what the right answer was, but as of today,
she can. There is now a right answer, in my functional sense. The
parameters of the new rule may still leave some or many applications
uncertain, but ordinarily the decision will not only settle the precise
question before the Court but will give sufficiently clear guidance on
how a range of related questions are likely to be decided.
But I don’t think I need to analyze examples to convince an audience of lawyers that the process of applying precedent is highly malleable. Arguments about whether a precedent can be distinguished are
the grist of “thinking like a lawyer” from the first day of law school to
the last or most important case of any litigator’s career. That doesn’t
mean that any outcome can be squared with any precedent. Indeed,
lawyers will very often agree that a given precedent can’t be squared
with one side’s position in a case. But it seems to me that that conclu-
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Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
316 U.S. 584, 598–600 (1942).
29 319 U.S. 105, 117 (1943).
30 Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943).
31 See, e.g., Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students: Supreme Court Precedent,
SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 2, 2019, 9:54 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/10/scotus-forlaw-students-supreme-court-precedent (describing a recent Supreme Court case dealing
with the question of overruling constitutional precedent as “a proxy for what lies ahead”
for Roe v. Wade).
32 Readers interested in examining the standard arguments for overruling and not
overruling precedents could do worse than to look at four cases, decided within six weeks
of each other last Term, in which the Supreme Court faced explicit arguments that
established precedents should be overruled: Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2408–09
(2019); Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2169 (2019); Gamble v. United States,
139 S. Ct. 1960, 1963–64 (2019); Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct.
1485, 1490–91 (2019). Stare decisis prevailed (though in one case only narrowly) in two of
four cases. Fun fact: Justice Gorsuch was the only member of the Court to vote to overrule
all four challenged precedents.
28
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sion is almost always based on general acceptance, even by those who
might like to see change, that the political or social value judgment
that lies behind the precedent represents the prevailing conventional
wisdom of the political classes of society. Perhaps at some future point
the precedent may be chipped away by distinctions and exceptions to
the point that there is a respectable, and perhaps even a winning,
argument that it should be sharply confined or even overruled. And in
some number of cases, there will be a strong but still contestable argument that the situation before the court is just distinguishable because
the case presents different facts and different policy considerations
than those that produced the precedent.
While stare decisis counsels strongly against overruling precedents, courts remain free to do so, and whether to do so is almost
always a question of judgment. Just as “time has upset many fighting
faiths,” as Justice Holmes reminded us,27 time has upset many wellestablished precedents. Indeed, sometimes it doesn’t take much time:
Jones v. Opelika,28 a decision upholding against First Amendment
challenge the application of a tax on door-to-door soliciting to
Jehovah’s Witnesses, was overruled by the Supreme Court less than a
year later in Murdock v. Pennsylvania,29 in time for the judgment in
the original case to be vacated on reargument.30 Today, it seems that
every case in which a Supreme Court precedent is called into the
slightest question, both the Justices and the commentators engage in
some fencing about the weight to be accorded to precedent, a debate
that many view as preliminary skirmishing over whether Roe v. Wade
will be overruled.31 But a glance at the cases in which the Court has
overruled precedent, or has conspicuously decided not to overrule a
precedent, makes clear that an exercise in judgment is involved.32
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384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
35 Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 723, 723–24 (1988).
36 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
37 See Monaghan, supra note 35, at 723.
38 Id.
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Even when Justices believe that a prior decision was wrong, the pull of
precedent will most often lead to its being left in place, and the decision to overrule balances some conclusion about just how wrong the
prior decision was with a host of discretionary factors, including the
extent to which, as Chief Justice Rehnquist put it in declining to overrule Miranda v. Arizona,33 the decision “has become embedded in
routine police practice[s].”34 One may strongly believe that overruling
Roe would be the wrong thing to do in any number of senses of the
word wrong, but I don’t think that there is any simple or mechanical
test that would allow one to decide that overruling any particular precedent is clearly right or wrong as a matter of the law of stare decisis.
I don’t need to say much about originalism in constitutional interpretation either, in part because the principal things I would have to
say about it were said beautifully and persuasively by my Columbia
colleague Henry Monaghan. In a 1988 law review article, Professor
Monaghan pointed to a paradox about originalism.35 While
originalism, like textualism, attempts to provide a methodology that is
objective and independent of policy preferences, the fact is that the
courts have departed significantly from originalism, not just in a few
minor or aberrational cases, but in cases such as Brown v. Board of
Education 36 that are not only accepted parts of the fabric of our law
and society but are regarded as vital decisions that helped keep the
country on a viable path.37
Brown is not going to be overruled, as Professor Monaghan
pointed out.38 Not only that, but the current constitutional debate
about issues like affirmative action is played out not with reference to
what the drafters or ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment might
have thought about those issues, but with reference to which vision of
equal protection of the laws is more consistent with the principles of
Brown. Professor Monaghan’s article derives its power not by articulating arguments for or against originalism as a principle of interpretation based on first principles of legitimacy, but from a recognition
that, even for a defender of a strong role for original intent in constitutional theory, the practice of stare decisis, not simply as a tool of
legal analysis but as a fundamental fact about the evolution of a legal
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Id. at 739.
For an example of a deeply imbedded principle of constitutional law that is likely not
conisistent with original intent and is not as universally admired as Brown, consider the
jurisprudence of the Eleventh Amendment. See, for example, William A. Fletcher, A
Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an
Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN.
L. REV. 1033 (1983), and the rich academic literature it has spaned.
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system and a society, requires courts to stand by settled law.39 That
practice serves purposes similar to those served by originalism itself as
a constraint on judicial decisionmaking and a foundation of a stable
society under law. Uprooting expectations and conceptions of justice
derived from Brown would be an unthinkable disaster, not only
because its principle is just, and not only because it represents a commitment to racial justice that is in a deep sense a part of the bedrock
meaning of equal protection of the law, but also because it is there,
and we have staked our society on it. In short, courts have often
departed, with good consequences, from originally intended meanings
of texts, and stare decisis will often require adherence to such decisions as precedents, even when the consequences of the prior decision
are less incontrovertibly beneficial than those of Brown.40
I would add only two thoughts on this subject. One is that there is
an inherent tension between the discipline of history and stare decisis
as a legal principle. The problem is that history, as a field of scholarship, is constantly in flux, open to new interpretations based on new
evidence and new paradigms of thought. It’s not just that lawyers and
judges aren’t trained to be good historians or that the kind of histories
on which we draw to interpret the Second Amendment or the Equal
Protection Clause are often tendentious arguments crafted to support
a preconceived legal position—although in my view, both of those
things are true. It’s that good history is always up for grabs, while for
the most part, law requires that the conclusions we draw today will be
settled law indefinitely into the future. Of course, it is possible for
precedents to be overruled. But that will happen when the precedent
no longer fits social needs and won’t (and shouldn’t) happen simply
because a young historian just wrote a Bancroft-prize winning book
that challenges the previously accepted historical consensus. In the
years since the earlier precedent was decided, a superstructure of law
may have been built upon it; tearing that structure down is unlikely to
be desirable even if a novel historical analysis reveals that the
originalist foundation of the structure was flawed.
The second point is that, as Professor Monaghan recognized,
once it is established that a decision like Brown departed from the
original intent of its framers and ratifiers and that we are profoundly
40
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grateful that it did, the foundation of originalism must be shaken.41
We might, with Professor Monaghan, want to establish a kind of presumption that courts should not readily depart from original intent, at
least as to the broad concept or principle behind the words, and at
least where that intent is discernible. But if there are exceptions, a
judge must ask herself, how do we know whether the current case is
one of them? Perhaps judges will be too quick to mistake their own
fallible policy preferences for the kind of basic principle that, a half
century and more hereafter, will look incontestable, and make the
judge a hero of history for having recognized the occasion. That fear
counsels that exceptions be rare. But there is also the danger that
judges will miss the occasion and will hew too closely to original intent
when the moment for another Brown is upon us. Into which category
do we place Roe v. Wade,42 Furman v. Georgia,43 Obergefell v.
Hodges,44 and District of Columbia v. Heller?45 And once those cases
have been decided, the same questions arise with respect to whether
any of them should be overruled, whether because our understanding
of “original intent” has changed or because a majority of the Justices
have become originalists? More relevant to the question of judicial
judgment, into which category would a judge have placed any of these
decisions, or for that matter Brown itself, ex ante, as the judge is faced
with arguments that the “original intent” of the framers points one
way, and the lessons of history since the framing to the current needs
of society point another?
VI
AND

DISCRETION

Let me return to Hart and Dworkin. As I’ve already suggested, it
seems to me that Hart has the better of the argument, insofar as he
recognizes that the role of the judge is not confined to identifying a
correct legal answer. At least in the sense that matters to lawyers and
judges, legal methodology does not point to a clear right answer dictated by legal methodology in the most controversial cases. Legal
methodology is too diffuse. Original intent jostles with stare decisis,
textualism with respect for the purposes of the legislature. Sometimes
all or most of the relevant factors line up to point in the same direction, and we can be confident that the law dictates a particular answer,
even where the judge, were she appointed as the ultimate lawgiver,
42
43
44
45

Id. at 723.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
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would have adopted a different rule. But cases are litigated, and hard
cases are hard, precisely because the jostling methodologies sometimes don’t point in the same direction. Judges must still decide those
cases.
But Dworkin too had an important insight. It is not enough to say
that judges have “discretion” to fill the gaps in the law with their decisions. Judges can’t just say, “well, there’s no clear answer here, so I
will answer the question according to what I think would be a good
rule.” That is not to say that the judge’s policy views are irrelevant. A
judge should certainly hesitate, where legal source materials yield no
clear answer, to adopt what she is confident is a bad rule. But we want
a judge to do more than vote for her preferred policy.
Dworkin argued that the judge must construct a conception of
the legal order that is coherent and just, and then decide individual
hard cases in a way that best advances that conception. There is some
truth, and some value, to that formulation. A judge is always looking
to root her answers to hard cases somewhere in the legal tradition,
somewhere external to her own policy views.
But it is far from clear that there is a single overarching set of
principles that genuinely drive our legal order. The legal order is a
hodgepodge of decisions made at different times for different historical reasons, by different actors facing different problems in different
eras, applying different ideologies. How can we make unified sense of
the compromises and shifts of direction that mark our history? In the
early 19th century, some abolitionists, like William Lloyd Garrison,
believed that the United States Constitution was not merely flawed
but was inherently “a covenant with death and an agreement with
hell” because it enshrined slavery, which had to be entirely rejected by
persons of good conscience;46 others argued even then, and the
historian Sean Wilentz has recently contended, that the original
Constitution actually did as much as could be done politically at the
time to undermine slavery.47 And whatever the Constitution of 1787
had to say about racial justice, between then and now we have had a
Civil War leading to the abolition of slavery and to what many
reformers, then and now, thought was the birth of a new, more just
republic embodied in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments—
followed by a retreat from that vision, with the end of Reconstruction,
the Supreme Court’s retreat from civil rights in cases like Plessy v.
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Ferguson,48 the onset of terrorism and lynch law in the South, and
nearly a century of Jim Crow and racial subjugation—followed in turn
by a revival in the mid-20th century, led by thinkers and activists like
Martin Luther King, of the vision of equality argued in the mid-19th
by Frederick Douglass. Is there really one vision on which we can
agree as representing the meaning of such a contested and convoluted
history?
And in the absence of plausible agreement, as Dworkin effectively recognizes, any given judge’s construction of the overall path of
the law will be only that judge’s own view. Except in the unusual case
where the historical evidence overwhelmingly points in a single direction, and where the judge recognizes that her own philosophy is
somehow at odds with the overall sense of justice immanent in our
history, each judge’s views on the right answer to a legal dispute will
almost certainly correlate consistently with the judge’s own policy
preference—as Dworkin’s own arguments about concrete legal issues
pretty well did with his.
But a more modest version of Dworkin’s approach does offer
some guidance to the judge in search of answers. If legal materials
point in different directions, there may well still be at least a persuasive argument, in a particular case, that the weight of some materials
is greater than that of others. Similarly, if the arguments for textualism
and stare decisis don’t generate a formula as simple and authoritative
as senators seem to want judicial nominees to pretend exists, that
doesn’t mean they lack all value. What is called for is an exercise of
judgment about the specific weight to be given to particular pieces of
evidence in particular cases. The text is the starting point, but I don’t
think we have to wait for cases in which the text yields an answer that
can convincingly be called “absurd” to decide that we are pretty sure
that the legislators who drafted and supported a statute or constitutional provision did not intend a particular result—not simply that it
did not anticipate a particular result, but that it, and the public who
voted for the law, would never have adopted the general principle for
which a litigant contends that the text stands. On the other hand, over
time a law’s particular language may come to seem absurd if read
according to an anachronistic conception, especially where that language purports to reflect a general principle rather than a limited specialized policy preference. If judges are not free to weigh and balance
such arguments, the resulting jurisprudence will be mechanical and
cold, producing results that appear silly or unjust, and will not command understanding and respect. If they do have that freedom, there

42254-nyu_95-3 Sheet No. 16 Side B

06/05/2020 12:42:34

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\95-3\NYU301.txt

646

unknown

Seq: 26

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

27-MAY-20

13:34

[Vol. 95:621

is a corresponding risk that the law in important and controversial
cases will seem to reflect nothing more than the judge’s own policy
wishes. The attempt to identify larger themes in the law, or principles
that can fairly be viewed as part of the tradition, rather than simply
part of an individual judge’s own philosophy, is a valuable tool in
trying to navigate between these conflicting dangers.
I started with the fear that my thoughts on these issues might
seem philosophically naive. I end with the fear that my practical focus
may not be terribly practical. To say that careful judgment is called for
is not very helpful in deciding how actual cases should come out. But
the recognition that the exercise of judicial judgment yields contingent
answers, rather than answers that are simply “correct,” has two valuable results. First, it gives a more realistic understanding of the nature
of judging and of the role of the judiciary in cases that deeply divide
the public and elected officials. And second, it softens a certain judicial arrogance that comes with the belief that one’s own conclusions
about a case, however derived or however one purports to derive
them, are emphatically right, to the exclusion of other answers.
VII
JUDGMENT

AND

RESTRAINT
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Those two results are important, and they are intertwined. First:
Just as it is important to understand the limits of what Chief Justice
Roberts could possibly mean by saying that a judge’s role is just to call
balls and strikes, it is important to understand the limits of what he
can possibly mean by saying that there are no “Trump judges” or
“Obama judges.” As I’ve already made clear, I think that judges in all
cases are looking for objectively correct answers, and in a great many
cases, we can find them. In cases where there are reasonably clear
right answers, litigants can be quite confident that neither their nor
the judge’s political convictions or former party affiliations will make
a difference to the outcome. Moreover, I hope it is true, and my experience of watching judges at work, both as a lawyer appearing before
them and as a colleague and participant-observer, suggests that it is,
that judges are not influenced by whether a particular result will
advantage a particular politician or political party.
But when it is recognized that the answers to a fairly large
number of significant legal questions are not dictated by some simple
methodology and that good arguments can be made for both sides,
not simply because lawyers are clever sophists but because in some
matters the legal materials are indeterminate and the decision calls for
an exercise of judgment, it becomes clear that the judge’s overall phi-
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losophy can make a great deal of difference. And by a judge’s philosophy, I don’t mean whether the judge voices a belief in “strict
constructionism” or a “living Constitution,” or any such slogan. I
mean that a judge’s sense of justice and political principle will matter.
This is true even at a very mundane level. In ordinary civil cases,
of the kind that will rarely if ever get the attention of the Supreme
Court, and that are indeed decided by “settled law,” there is still considerable room for the exercise of judgment. In the majority of civil
cases, judges are called upon to decide whether a complaint states a
claim for relief, and at a later stage of the case, whether there are
genuine issues of material fact for a jury to decide. The drafters of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the 1930s saw a very limited role
for these procedural mechanisms—the motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, and the Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. The former was intended for cases that presented
only an issue of law because the facts were essentially agreed upon,
and the latter for cases in which, after wide ranging discovery, one
side could identify no evidence that would permit a jury to decide the
case its way. But the pressure of expanding caseloads led the Supreme
Court to expand the role first of summary judgment, in the Celotex
cases of the 1980s,49 and then a generation later of the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, in Twombly 50 and Iqbal.51 Today
deciding these motions too is a matter of judgment and discretion.
Deciding whether a complaint contains “sufficient factual allegations
to be plausible” is very different than deciding merely whether a complaint alleges in general terms a legal claim. Deciding whether a reasonable jury can make a fact finding on a particular cold record is very
different from deciding whether there is simply no evidence to support one acknowledged element of a plaintiff’s claim. These are now
judgment calls, and where there is judgment to be applied, reasonable
people can more easily disagree.
On such questions, judges who are generally skeptical of whether
the value of litigation exceed its costs will surely apply the standard
differently in particular cases than judges who believe that litigants
should generally have their “day in court.” Thus, more open-ended
standards for deciding pretrial dispositive motions are likely to generate different outcomes depending on whether the judges are
appointed by Democrats or Republicans. And what is true in these
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mundane applications is true in deciding large and controversial questions of statutory interpretation or constitutional law.
That is not a terrible thing. Nor is it terrible that judges with different substantive political philosophies are likely to see close judgment calls about the meanings of statutes and constitutional
provisions differently. That is a feature of the system, not a bug. It is
what makes Alexander Bickel’s famed “[c]ounter-[m]ajoritarian difficulty”52 less of a bogey than it was painted: Because judges are
appointed through a political process that vets their ideas and principles as well as their lawyerly skills, over time the public will have its
way, and a Supreme Court that is consistently at odds with the values
of the people will change, over time, with the results of democratic
elections. If there were no such thing as “Reagan judges” or
“Roosevelt judges,” the body of Supreme Court case law would look
decidedly different than it does.
Second: A recognition that the appointment of judges has, and is
intended to have, political effects, and that the open texture of at least
an important subset of legal rules opens the door to varying interpretations of texts and precedents, should temper the views of both politicians and judges. That understanding might help the public, the press,
and the politicians to learn that judicial decisionmaking is not a matter
of one side following a legitimate judicial philosophy and the other
being unscrupulous or hypocritical. It’s simply that differences over
the proper construction of legal materials are inevitable and that the
“judges’ own values,” in some sense of that phrase, will play a role in
deciding hard cases. In this area as in many others, damping down the
rhetoric would be healthy.
That recognition should also lead to a measure of what has been
called judicial restraint. As Professor Bickel taught, the openness of
legal reasoning suggests that the proper exercise of judicial judgment
calls for judges to be cautious about their use of the Constitution—
and I would add, about their interpretation of statutes, and their
application of legal standards calling for the exercise of discretion as
well.53 I can hear skeptics saying, “aha, liberal judges, politicians, and
editorialists have discovered the virtues of judicial restraint now that
they do not have a majority on the Supreme Court.” There is no doubt
some truth to this, just as there is truth to the reciprocal charge that
former advocates of judicial restraint seem perfectly happy to have
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judges overrule longstanding precedents and strike down acts of
Congress based on vague constitutional texts once the judges’ interpretations of those texts correspond to their political preferences. I
ruefully acknowledge that over the long ascendancy of a more politically conservative Supreme Court, I have sometimes felt that I now
understand what lawyers and judges educated in the 1920s must have
felt as they read decisions of the Supreme Court in the 1950s into the
1970s.
But other experiences have educated me in that direction as well.
As a law student, I was not much persuaded by my teachers’ questioning of the ability of judges to manage institutions such as prisons
through injunctive relief resulting from law-reform litigation. I must
say that the experience of presiding over prison-conditions litigation
pretty quickly led me to understand what my professors had been
talking about years before. And dealing with both the practical
problems of such cases, and the daily grind of deciding other difficult
cases, particularly in collaboration with judges of strong intelligence
and legal skill, but very different political and jurisprudential assumptions and premises from my own, has given me a different perspective
on legal issues that can seem very clear to those who do not have to
grapple with actual records of discovery and trial, and actual textual
material, day after day, across a wide variety of legal specialties. The
recognition that there is not a method that will always yield unanimous answers, or for that matter that will yield consistently just outcomes, is humbling—and humility is a cardinal virtue for judges. A
belief that one is simply pursuing a strict and objective methodology
can lead to a willingness to overturn the judgments of one’s predecessors just as much as a belief that one is entitled to pursue one’s own
vision of justice from the bench.
The title of this lecture is “Complexity, Judgment, and Restraint.”
I was asked by the organizers to put a colon after that title, to be
followed by a more descriptive subtitle describing what the lecture
was intended to be about. But I like the title, because it summarizes
my thesis. The law is complex. Navigating complexity leaves room for
discretion, and thus requires the exercise of judgment. The power to
exercise one’s own judgment, however, in matters affecting the governance of a democracy, in turn entails some sense of caution and
restraint. And with that, I thank you for your attention.
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